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In the early 17th century during Swedish-Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth war there were 
very few soldiers of the Swedish army that were originally subjects to Sigmund III. This 
uncommon situation occurred because of various reasons, most notably, the core character of 
the conflict which was caused not only by the dynastic quarrel between the Polish and Swedish 
line of Vasas but also by cultural, political and religious differences. As the war in Livonia 
continued, Polish public finance system proved itself more and more inadequate. That caused 
unpaid Polish-Lithuanian soldiers to form confederations in order to make the authorities 
pay overdue wages. This rouge soldiers’ crisis was exacerbated by a new war between the 
Commonwealth of Poland and Russia (1609–1619), which increased the crime and banditry 
in the Commonwealth of Poland. The authorities were forced to form military units — partly 
from the soldiers participating in the confederates — that were sent across the eastern border. 
Interestingly, at the same time a number of Zaporozhian Cossacks and Polish cavalrymen 
joined the army of Jacob de la Gardie, which occupied the area of Great Novgorod. Troops led 
by Henryk Dembinski, Jaromir Plecki and Stanislaw Wolski were a part of Swedish fighting 
force but  — as the author remarks  — might also have been involved in a larger false flag 
operation planned by Lithuanian intelligence in order to undermine financial potential of 
Sweden. It is very possible that this operation was supervised by the Lithuanian hetman Jan 
Karol Chodkiewicz and/or by the starosta wieliski Aleksander Gosiewski. 
Keywords: Polish-Lithuanian-Swedish-Russian relations in the early 17th c., Polish-Lithuanian-
Swedish war in Livonia, The Time of Troubles, Swedish occupation of Novgorod, Military 
confederations, Polish-Lithuanian mercenaries, Intelligence of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.
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В начале XVII в., во время войны Речи Посполитой с Швецией в Ливонии, в шведской 
армии служили лишь несколько солдат, подданных Сигизмунда  III. Эта ситуация 
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была в основном обусловлена династическим характером конфликта между польской 
и  шведской линиями Ваза, а  также культурными, политическими и  религиозными 
различиями. Польско-литовская система налогообложения не смогла справиться 
с затяжным конфликтом в Ливонии. Это привело к тому, что неоплачиваемые польско-
литовские солдаты, чтобы побудить власти выплатить задолженность, образовали 
военные конфедерации. Война между Польшей и Россией (1609–1619 гг.) углубила этот 
кризис. По данной причине в Речи Посполитой выросли преступность и бандитизм. 
Примером может служить рейд полка Яна Карвацкого на Волынь и  ее частичное 
разрушение. Путь к решению проблемы состоял в том, чтобы сформировать воинские 
части для отправки за восточную границу, частично из  солдат, входивших в  такие 
конфедерации. Интересно, что в  это время несколько полков запорожских казаков 
под командованием Прокотовского, Гжегожа Яницкого, Миколая Ясинского, Мачея 
Халаима, Андрея Наливайки, Хвостовца, Федора Бориспольца и хоругвей регулярной 
польско-литовской армии присоединились к армии Якоба Делагарди, оккупировавшей 
регион Великого Новгорода. Солдаты во главе с  Хенриком Дембинским, Яромиром 
Плецким и Станиславом Вольским вошли в состав шведской армии, но, как указывает 
сам автор, это также могло быть частью более крупной операции под так называемым 
фальшивым флагом, запланированной литовской разведкой для нанесения ущерба 
финансовому потенциалу Швеции, которая, проиграв войну против Дании, 
оказалась на грани финансовой катастрофы. Очень возможно, что эта операция 
была организована литовским гетманом Яном Карлом Ходкевичем и/или старостой 
велижским Александром Госьевским. Статья подготовлена на основе неизвестных 
архивных материалов.
Ключевые слова: сношения между Речью Посполитой, Швецией и  Россией в  начале 
XVII  в., война Речи Посполитой со Швецией в  Ливонии, Смутное время, Шведская 
оккупация Новгорода, военные конфедерации, польско-литовские наемники, разведка 
Великого княжества Литовского.
Polish-Lithuanian “soldiers of fortune” were quite unusual in the Swedish army 
during the first two decades of the seventeenth century, at least in comparison with their 
western European counterparts. Admittedly, there were probably four infantry outfits 
consisting of Poles, Hungarians and Livonian Germans (who were also subjects to Sigis-
mund III Vasa) fighting alongside the Swedes between 1603–1605: 144 soldiers, mostly 
Polish, served under Hans Vegesack [Feyzak], 194 under Pawel Stylicki [Påvfel Stillicken], 
81 under Tiedeman Schro, and Michael Horvath led 113 men. They weren’t volunteers, 
though, but rather captives and/or deserters1.
There were at least a couple of reasons behind this situation. Firstly, Sigismund’s ad-
ministration swiftly and decisively addressed the problem of desertions that had been 
acute earlier  — during the Moldavian war of 1595–1600. In February and March of 
1601 the parliament deliberated in Warsaw and passed a resolution entitled “About those 
who leave for foreign military formations”. The act unequivocally banned subjects of the 
king from enlisting in foreign armies, especially Swedish one, “during the Livonian expe-
1 Generalstaben. Sveriges krig 1611–1632. Vol. I (Danska och ryska krigen). Stockholm, 1936. S. 577; 
Regestr piechothny Węgrów i Polaków (1603) // Stockholm Riksarkivet (further — SRA). Krigshistoriska 
handlingar (further  — Kh). Militaria (further  — M). 1282; Mankell  J. Uppgifter rörande svenska 
krigsmagtens styrka, sammansättning och fördelning sedan slutet af fëmtonhundratalet. Stockholm, 1865. 
Appendix. S. 11; Łopatecki K. “Disciplina militaris” w wojskach Rzeczypospolitej do połowy XVII wieku. 
Białystok, 2012. S. 457–458.
720 Вестник СПбГУ. История. 2018. Т. 63. Вып. 3
dition” (durante hac expeditione Livonica)2. Secondly, one could assume that such a small 
number of Polish-Lithuanian volunteers might be linked to unusual characteristics of this 
conflict. The war in Livonia was not only a clash over the province but also a dynastic con-
flict. Arguments inside the dynasty and religious differences also came into play. Polish 
and Lithuanian soldiers, Catholic as well as Protestant and Orthodox, all associated the 
wellbeing of their country (Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania) with 
Sigismund III. In other words, it was impossible for them to swear an allegiance, on the 
Bible, to Charles IX. Lastly, there was the problem of a language barrier. Most of Polish 
noble-born soldiers, with the exception of Livonians and Estonians, rarely spoke German, 
Swedish or even Latin. The situation with peasants serving in infantry was similar, but 
to a greater extent. Of course, Swedish high command wasn’t especially concerned about 
it — having at its disposal battle-hardened and dependable western European and British 
mercenaries.
This changed in just a few years. During Livonian conflict Polish-Lithuanian armies 
were able to succeed in the field, most notably, in the battle of Kircholm (1605), but siege 
attempts and maintaining control of strongholds remained problematic for them. In ad-
dition, inadequate fiscal policy of the country soon led to withholding soldiers’ wages. 
Unpaid military formations started forming military confederations and often left Livonia 
to wreak havoc on the estates belonging not only to the crown but also to the church and 
private citizens in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and central and southeastern parts of the 
Kingdom of Poland3. During the Livonian war four such military unions came about, con-
taining about 8400–8500 soldiers in total. In 1602, the confederation of Biały Kamień (Bi-
aly Kamien) was formed out of 32 cavalry outfits, consisting of almost 3500 men strong, 
formerly serving under Great hetman of Poland Jan Zamoyski (due to the lack of money 
in both Lithuanian and Polish treasury he had to pay substantial wages to soldiers out of 
his own pocket — which seriously undermined his considerable fortune and was one of 
the reasons why he stepped down from the Livonian command). Field hetman of Lithua-
nia Jan Karol Chodkiewicz who took over Zamoyski had similar problems. In 1603, eight 
cavalry outfits consisting of 1000 riders revolted and formed a confederation of Dorpat, 
and between 1605–1606 other 900–1000 soldiers joined the confederation known as “brz-
eska”. Two more confederations formed over this long decade during the first phase of the 
Livonian war were: “grodzienska” in 1609–1610, consisting of 2075 soldiers, and “inflanc-
ka”, consisting of 700–800 men strong4.
The real problem for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth turned out to be a truly 
catastrophic aftermath of the first stage of the war with Russia that occurred between 
1609–1612. At the turn of 1611–1612 another confederation was formed in response to 
overdue payment, from the members of Polish-Lithuanian garrison in Moscow and the 
late Jan Piotr Sapieha’s regiment, which supported it. Soon another confederation was 
formed from the soldiers of the garrison defending Smolensk. Both unions totaled over 
7000 people. These rebellious military units for two years had been raiding wealthy re-
2 Volumina Constitutionum. T. II (1550–1609), сz. 2 (1587–1609). Warszawa, 2008. S. 272.
3 Wimmer J. Wojsko i skarb Rzeczypospolitej u schyłku XVI i w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku 
// Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości. 1968. T. XIV. S. 18–24; Ciara M. Konfederacje wojskowe w 
Polsce w latach 1590–1610 // Ibid. 1988. Т. XXXI. S. 68–80.
4 Urwanowicz J. Wojskowe “sejmiki”. Koła w wojsku Rzeczypospolitej XVI–XVII wieku. Białystok, 1996. 
S. 92–93; Filipczak-Kocur A. Konfederacja grodzieńska wojska litewskiego w latach 1609–1610 // Pamiętnik 
Biblioteki Kórnickiej. 1981. Z. 18. S. 175–198.
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gions of the country, for generations unaffected by the tragedies of war: Ukraina, Volyn, 
western provinces of Grand Duchy of Lithuania and also Kujawy (Kuyavia), Pomorze 
(Pomerania) and Prussia. Chaos and anarchy were only increased by the multitude of 
other demoralized military formations, which officially weren’t “confederated”. Under the 
circumstances the regiments of Zaporozhian Cossacks were especially fierce, probably 
because they, with the exception of a hundred strong, state funded, registered Cossacks, 
“lived” only on spoils of war and plunder5.
In 1613, the royal administration, in particular the highest Lithuanian officials  — 
Chancellor Lew Sapieha and Hetman Chodkiewicz, and local governments of noblemen 
(sejmiki) finally started to fight this scourge. Of course, trying to attack highly capable and 
organized military confederations was tantamount tilting at windmills. This adversary 
was too strong. But dispersed and demoralized veterans of the Russian Time of Troubles 
turned into bandits were a different story. The tactic used against them was fairy simple — 
do not let them cross the border between Russia, the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania.
To achieve that new commanders, who were used to leading exactly such type of 
warriors, were employed. The best example would be Aleksander Lisowski. He had been 
previously convicted — by the verdict of the Sejm court — of infamy for inciting mu-
tiny among unpaid military outfits in Livonia in 1604 and pardoned in 1611. Between 
1608–1610 Lisowski was leading Cossacks in the service of False Dmitri II. In 1611–1612, 
he managed to recruit an impressive party of 2000 men, mostly Zaporozhian Cossacks, 
in Zavolotch. With this force, he was quite successful in harassing the Russians, and by 
reaching a local agreement with the governor of Pskov actually reduced their pressure on 
the border. It is interesting to note that while recruiting his soldiers Lisowski was able to 
enlist two English captains Thomas Lichfield and John Stanford6 right from under Jacob 
de la Gardie. Another example of this type of a new, canny commander may be Zachariasz 
Zarudzki, who, due to the magic of his family name (he was the brother of ataman Iwan 
Zarudzki — a big supporter of Maryna Mniszek’s claims to the tsar’s throne), was very 
popular with Cossacks.
Since 1612 Zaporozhian Cossacks had been also enlisting to serve Jacob de la Gardie, 
the governor of Novgorod. This was largely possible thanks to suspension of hostilities be-
tween the Commonwealth and Sweden signed by Aleksander Gosiewski and de la Gardie 
in 1611 (strenuous talks had been on since the turn of 1612, and in June 1614 the sides 
decided on a truce until September of 16167) that included Swedish-occupied region of 
Novgorod. The Swedish commander couldn’t count on any reinforcements as his country 
was entangled in a war with Denmark at the time, so he welcomed Cossacks’ enlistments 
and was seeking their support himself, especially due to the problem of False Dmitri III, 
5 Michałek A. Zejście załogi polskiej z Kremla i konfederacja Cieklińskiego 1612–1614 // Teki Histo-
ryczne-Cahiers d`histoire-Historical papers. Vol. XV. London, 1966–1968. P. 113–142; Michałek A. Konfe-
deracja wojska stołecznego pod regimentem imć Cieklińskiego Józefa // Ibid. Vol. XVI. London, 1969–1971. 
P. 166–210.
6 Volumina Constitutionum. T. III (1611–1640). S. 1  (1611–1626). Warszawa, 2010. S. 43; A. Go-
sevskii  — A. Lisovskomu, Pokrov, 20.05.1613  //  Stockholm Krigsarkivet. Gustav Adolfsverket. Avskrifts-
amlingen. II: С 3 (further  — KrA GA. A. II: С 3); A. Lisovskii  — R. Sesilu. Ex Castris ad Zavolotiam, 
10.08.1611 // Elementa ad fontium editiones. Romae, 1962. Vol. VI (Res polonicae Iacobo I Angliae reg-
nante conscriptae ex Archivis publicis Londoniarum). P. 108–109. 
7 Generalstaben. Sveriges krig 1611–1632. Vol. II (Polska kriget). Stockholm, 1936. S. 4–29.
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who had just captured Pskov and was even shortly backed by the first militia draft of 
Cossacks stationed near Moscow, which was giving him sleepless nights. De la Gardie was 
so troubled that he even suggested cooperating with Lisowski in fighting a burdensome 
usurper .However, we don’t know if the Lithuanian colonel agreed8.
Eventually, at the turn of June 1612 False Dmitri III was overturned in Pskov and 
handed over to the leaders of the first militia. De la Gardie seized the moment, and with 
the support of Evert Horn`s forces captured Koporie (Kopor’e), Jama (Jamgorod), Gdov 
and Ivangorod between June and December, which Swedes had been trying to conquer 
since July of 16109.
Probably three or four outfits of Zaporozhian Cossacks participated in this campaign 
under the command of captains Prokotowski, Grzegorz Janicki, Mikołaj Jasiński and Ma-
ciej Chalaim. Their letters to de la Gardie prove that they were recruited by Evert Horn at 
the end of June 1612. The terms were very generous — the payment per quarter was set at 
“18 zloty for each horse”. Unfortunately, the governor of Novgorod wasn’t a generous man 
and effectively lowered their wages to only 3 zloty per quarter10. It may sound harsh but de 
la Gardie had his reasons. Firstly, he was strapped for gold even to pay his own troops and 
western European mercenaries, and, secondly, Horn`s promises to Cossacks were unreal-
istic. The payment for Ukrainian Cossacks recruited for so to speak “special operations” at 
the time amounted to 15 florens or 15 red (golden coin) zloty per quarter11.
The story didn’t end there, though. During the siege of Ivangorod Cossacks suffered 
heavy casualties, and even when Horn, undoubtedly, appreciating their sacrifices, doubled 
their pay up to the amount of 6 zloty, they still were dissatisfied. They complained to de 
la Gardie that “Russians ransacked their camp, injured or killed both men and horses and 
now many of them have to go on foot behind the army” and demanded a raise to 30 zloty 
for the next quarter12. During the period in question even the most elite cavalry units in 
the army of Commonwealth were paid less (hussars got 25 zloty per quarter13). So, it is 
easy to understand that ongoing collaboration between this group of Cossacks and de la 
Gardie was impossible.
Next, a more numerous group of Cossacks was enlisted into Swedish service in Russia 
in autumn 1612. In September, after the failed attempt to help Polish-Lithuanian garrison 
besieged in Moscow, regiments under Andrij Nalewajko (Andrii Nalevayko), Chwostow-
iec (Khvostovec) and Fiodor Boryszpolec (Fedor Boryspolec) (about 3500 men strong14) 
8 Kordt B. Iz semeinogo arkhiva grafov De-la-Gardi. Ia. Delagardi  — A. Lisovskomu. Novogrod, 
23.01.1612 // Uchenye zapiski imperatorskogo Iur’evskogo universiteta. Vol. 2. Iur’ev, 1894. Prilozhenie 2. 
P. 14–16; Pskovskie letopisi. Vol. V, iss. 1. Moscow, 2003. P. 140; Zamiatin G. Rossiia i Shvetsiia v nachale 
XVII veka. Ocherki politicheskoi i voennoi istorii. St. Petersburg, 2008. P. 277–278.
9 Zamiatin G. Rossiia i Shvetsiia… S. 280–281; Dzh. Spens — R. Sesilu, Stokgolm, 30.09.1610 // The 
National Archives (Kew). State Papers 95-1 (Sweden). L. 170; Bohun Т. Najemnicy z Wysp Brytyjskich w 
armii szwedzkiej na początku XVII wieku //  Studia z dziejów stosunków Rzeczypospolitej z Państwem 
Moskiewskim w XVI–XVII wieku. Zabrze; Tarnowskie Góry, 2013. S. 116–147.
10 M. Iasinskii i M. Khalaim — Ia. Delagardi, (?), 9.08.1612 // KrA. GA. A. II: C 3. 
11 Bewisse Avise, die Ich Jürgen Sahm meiner haben den Instruction und besehens nach von dieser 
meiner Reise mitt gebrachn, Reval (?), after August 1615 // SRA. Kh. M. 1289. 
12 M. Iasinskii i M. Khalaim — Ia. Delagardi, Szarkymy, 13.06.1612 // KrA. GA. A. II: C 3; M. Iasinskii 
i M. Khalaim — Ia. Delagardi, (?), 9.08.1612 // Ibid. 
13 Bewisse Avise, die Ich Jürgen Sahm… // SRA. Kh. M. 1289. 
14 Bohun Т. Moskwa 1612.Warszawa, 2005. S. 190–242; Z dopitiv zaporos’kikh kozakіv, vziatikh v po-
lon v boiu pіd Olontsem, Moskva, mart 1614  // Dokumenti rosіis’kikh arkhіvіv z іstorії Ukraїni. Vol. 1. 
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left the army of Hetman Chodkiewicz to seek employment elsewhere. They were allowed 
to do so because the third quarter of their service had just ended. The Cossacks were 
stationed near Toropiec, which had been captured by Swedes, and awaited offers from 
recruiters. Lithuanian referendary Gosiewski tried to enlist them but he was outcompeted 
by Horn and de la Gardie who had made Cossacks an attractive offer six months earli-
er. They couldn’t accept it then because of an outstanding contract with Hetman Chod-
kiewicz15. Now, after the election of high command (Nalewajko won again and for other 
regiments the Cossacks elected former sotniks Sidor and Trofimov colonels) they left for 
Novgorod where soldiers pledged allegiance to Gustav Adolf in an evangelical rite16.
In 1613 the governor of Novgorod found himself in very tough situation — Michael 
Romanov became Tsar in March. This meant not only the end of the dreams of installing 
Prince Charles Philip on the Moscow throne but also the beginning of troubles in his own 
dominion. The new Tsar was immediately accepted by yet unsubdued Pskov, and in May 
and at the turn of June and July Tichvin revolted and was captured by the armies of Sie-
mion Prozorovski and governor (voyevoda) Leontii Veljaminov. The rebellion also broke 
out in Gdov (where Swedish deputy Volmar von Ungern was captured and put in prison 
in Pskov with the rest of the captives). Losing Tichvin was especially dangerous for de la 
Gardie because Russians could now disrupt the communication line between Novgorod 
and Staraya Ladoga (across the Volkhov river)17.
The Russians also took control over Viazma, Dorohobuz and Belaia (Biała). This en-
dangered the garrison of Smolensk, and put the Commonwealth on the defensive. In these 
circumstances de la Gardie and Gosiewski came to an agreement not only to stay out of 
each other’s way but actually to help each other if the situation on Lithuanian — Novgorod 
borderland required it. Lithuanian referendary put Cossacks under Sidor and Boryszpolec 
in this operation, but Nalewajko’s regiment returned to Lithuania18, probably following 
orders issued by Gosiewski or Chodkiewicz.
About 1500  Zaporozhian Cossacks remained in the Swedish army. They were or-
dered to join the outfit of western European mercenaries, comprising 3000 men strong, 
under the command of Daniel Hepburn. Their goal was to retake Tichvin19.
The siege didn’t take long — just about a month. Cossacks played a major role in 
taking not very well-fortified Vvedensky Monastery, but suffered heavy casualties in the 
failed assault on 7 September, and by 12 September 1613 had left the Swedish army. De la 
Dokumenti do іstorії zaporoz’kogo kozatstva 1613–1629 rr. / eds L. Voitovich, L. Zaborovskii, Ia. Іsaєvich, 
F. Sisin, A. Turilov, B. Floria. L’vіv, 1998. P. 64–65.
15 A. Nalivaiko — Ia. Delagardi. Borowicze, 21.02.1612 // KrA. GA. A. II: C 3; M. Shirai — E. Gornu, 
Jewanow (?), 27.03.1612 // Ibid; Ia. Lukashevich — E. Gornu, Szorkowa Dolina z Słobody, 2.04.1612 // Ibid.
16 Z dopitiv zaporos’kikh… S. 64–65; Sidor — Ia. Delagardi, (?), ianvar’ 1613 // KrA. GA. A. II: C 3. 
17 Zamiatin G. Rossiia i Shvetsiia… S. 284–285; Zamiatin G. “K Rossiiskomu tsarstviiu pristoiat”. 
Bor’ba za osvobozhdenie russkikh gorodov, zakhvachennykh shvedami, v 1613–1614 gg. V. Novgorod, 2012. 
P. 58–74; Shaskol’skii I. Shvedskaia interventsiia v Karelii v nachale XVII v. Petrozavodsk, 1950. P. 108.
18 Sidor — Ia. Delagardi, Iiun’ 1613 (?) // KrA. GA. A. II: C 3; Z dopitiv… P. 64–65.
19 Rasprosnyia rechi cherkashenina Ileiki, Moscow, 19.12.1613  //  Rossijskij godudarstvennij arhiv 
drevnikh aktov (RGADA). F. 210, Op. 9. D. 11. Stb. 3. L. 481–482; Rasprosnyia rechi cherkashenina, vziatago 
pod Kolmogorkim ostrogom pri pristupe, o chisle napadavshikh i imenakh nachal’nikov, Moskva, posle 
8.10.1613 // Akty Moskovskogo Gosudarstva, izdannye Imperatorskoiu Akademiiu nauk / ed. by N. A. Pop-
ov. Vol. I. St. Petersburg, 1890. P. 82; Otpiska iaroslavskikh voevod Vasiliia Tiumenskago s tovarishchi ob 
otsylke v Moskvu kazakov Kuz’my Nevorova da Smirnogo Ivanova, vsledstvie obvineniia ikh v izmene, s 
prilozheniem rasprosnykh rechei, i dopros tekh kazakov v Moskve, Iaroslavl, posle 11.01.1614 // Ibid. P. 91–
92; Zamiatin G. Rossiia i Shvetsiia… P. 73–74.
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Gardie didn’t intend to uphold his promise to pay them for the fourth quarter of the year, 
and heavy loses both of men and horses discouraged them from continuing their service 
there. That effectively ended the siege of Tichvin20. In the following months the regiments 
of Sidor and Boryszpolec operated in the Lake Onega region and on the shores of the 
White Sea but were unable to capture either Andomsky ostroshok or Kholmogory — 
important strategic points on the trade route from Arkhangelsk to Moscow — defended 
by Russians supported by the British mercenaries under the command of Sir Arthur 
Aston. They also failed in capturing Sumsky Ostrog. Finally, Cossack regiments were 
defeated in the battle of Olonec21.
In 1614, the army of de la Gardie had three outfits of regular Polish-Lithuanian mili-
tary at its disposal: one unit of hussars under Hieronim Dembiński and two more similar 
cavalry units called “petyhorcy” (the main difference between them and the hussars being 
their lighter armor) led by Jaromir Plecki and Stanisław Wolski. Their force totalled no 
more than 300 men. The scarcity of sources doesn’t enable us to accurately present all 
aspects of their service in 1614–1615. An anonymous letter written by a group of officers 
from these units to de la Gardie suggests that they completed a full recruitment proce-
dure involving the signing of the contract, whose details — the duration and monetary 
compensation remain unknown — and, more importantly, swearing to uphold the terms. 
Their pledge taken in accordance with the evangelical rite was received by Evert Horn 
instead of Gustav Adolf (his full titulature was mentioned in the document)22.
There is every indication to suggest that their contract was an effect of the agree-
ment between Gosiewski and de la Gardie — mentioned earlier. It is worth noting that at 
the turn of December of 1614 this agreement also allowed the governor of Novgorod to 
give permission to Zachariasz Zarudzki`s regiment to stay in Molvotritche, a settlement 
which is hard to be identified on the map, located to the north west of lake Ilmen) while 
it was preparing to cavalry run alongside the banks of the Volga River as far as Nizhnii 
Novgorod23.
At the beginning of 1615  Evert Horn attempted at capturing Pskov. The plan was 
to create a diversion in Tichvin area. This task was carried out by Samuel Cobron’s men, 
while the other group: 200  Swedish and foreign mercenaries, outfits under Dembińs-
ki, Plecki and Wolski and Asmus Glazenap’s and Jacob Duval’s soldiers, about 700 men 
strong, led by Horn, Robert Moor and Paul Gottberg, assaulted the city trying to take it, or 
if that failed, to cut off their food supply and force it into submission. Polish-Lithuanian 
units under the high command of Dembiński were especially precious to Horn because he 
didn’t have enough cavalry in his service. He also expected his plan to succeed because he 
20 Rasprosnyia rechi cherkashenina Ileiki, Moscow, 19.12.1613; Rasprosnyia rechi Antsa Shvarka 
(VIII), Belozero, 4.10.1613 // Dopolneniia k Aktam Istoricheskim sobranyia i izdanyia Arkheograficheskoiu 
Kommiseiu / eds Ia. Berednikov, M. Korkunov. Vol. II. St. Petersburg, 1846. P. 15; Zamiatin G. “K Rossiiskomu 
tsarstviiu pristoiat” … P. 98–99; Kurbatov O. Tikhvinskoe osadnoe sidenie 1613 g. Moscow, 2006. P. 30–44.
21 Shaskol’skii I. Shvedskaia interventsiia v Karelii… P. 108–112.
22 Anonim — Ia. Delagardi, Novgorod, 1614 // Tartu Ülikooli Raamatukogu (further — TÜR). F. 6:B. 
L. 111–111 оb.
23 Z. Zarutskii  — E. Gornu, Molwotrycze (Molvotrichi), 25.11.1614  //  KrA. GA. A. II: C 3; Z gra-
moti, vruchenoї u Posol’s’komu prikazі novgorods’kim poslam Ia. Boborikіnu і M. Muraviovu, Moscow, 
9.03.1615 // Dokumenti rosіis’kikh arkhіvіv z іstorії Ukraїni. Т. 1. L’viv, 1998. P. 78; Skobelkin O. Smuta i 
sud’by sluzhilykh “nemtsev” // Mininskie chteniia. Sbornik nauchnykh trudov po istorii Smutnogo vremeni 
v Rossii nachala XVII v. V pamiat’ 400-letiia Nizhegorodskogo Podviga / eds A. Kuznetsov, A. Morokhin, 
O. Naumov. Nizhnii Novgorod, 2012. P. 245.
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had some conspirators within the city walls (recruited from “posadskiie ljudi” — residents 
of the bailey, probably merchants). Furthermore, Horn was awaiting reinforcements — 
about 600 men under Jan Karwacki (Johann Carvatsky)24. On the other hand, food supply 
to Pskov was already controlled by Swedish forces at Porchov and Gdov (retaken in Sep-
tember of 1614) — cities to the north and east of the town. The only remaining open route 
was to the west through Izborsk until Livonia25.
Robert Moor’s units, under the command of Horn at the time, arrived in Pskov at the 
second half of January 1615 but weren’t able to seriously threaten the city. The conspira-
tors detonated an explosive beneath the city walls but it failed to do anything more than a 
lot of noise. Their operation was also premature, being conducted even before the Swedish 
forces arrived. Governors of Pskov, Ivan Chovanski and Fiodor Buturlin, had little trouble 
in repairing whatever damage was done. Also, Horn’s and Moor’s forces didn’t have any 
artillery or siege equipment at their disposal. They tried to assault the city on 25 January, 
but the attack was easily repelled. So, the blockade of Pskov began but, in spite of ensuring 
control of the route between Izborsk and Pskovo-Pechersky Monastery, brought about 
little effect26.
Karwacki, despite earlier promises, refused to back his efforts because of the inability 
to sufficiently supply his troops in this area, at least, according to Horn27. By the way, the 
decision not to join Moor might have been for the better because it allowed him to raid 
part of Volyn in April 1615. The bloody activities of Karwacki ended when his regiment 
was destroyed the next month by the regular Polish army led by Stanislaw Żółkiewski. 
Karwacki himself, as well as three chieftains of his “gang of bandits”, was publicly executed 
in Lvov28.
Meanwhile, there emerged a conflict between Moor’s outfits and Polish-Lithuanian 
troops, and Swedish soldiers and western European mercenaries. There were fights and 
dishonorable assaults, and, quite possibly, even duels. The root of the problem was, of 
course, money. Horn didn’t pay Poles and Lithuanians their wages for the second quar-
ter of 1615. Although he himself ensured Gustav Adolf that his hands were clean in this 
mater, his correspondence with Dembiński and Jan Kunowski presents another perspec-
tive. Dembiński also accused the Swedish commander of bias in dividing provisions, and 
breaking the agreement of 1614 (presently unknown to us), according to which Swedish 
King committed himself to recruit 4000  soldiers from the Commonwealth. In this sit-
uation Dembiński and his officers threatened to form a confederation and raid estates 
belonging to the Swedish crown (probably, Novgorod region)29. It was mostly an empty 
threat — 300 cavalrymen simply couldn’t put the same amount of pressure on the Swedes 
as over a dozen thousands had done earlier on the Commonwealth’s administration and 
24 E. Gorn  — Gustavu Adol’fu, Novgorod, 27.04.1615  /  Arsen’ev V. Arsen’evskie shvedskie bumagi. 
Vol. 1 (1611–1615 gg.) // Sbornik Novgorodskogo obshchestva liubitelei drevnostei. Iss. 5. Novgorod, 1911. 
P. 52; Zamiatin G. Rossiia i Shvetsiia… P. 307–309.
25 Zamiatin G. Rossiia i Shvetsiia… P. 307–309.
26 Ibid; Shaskol’skii I. Shvedskaia interventsiia… P. 108–112.
27 E. Gorn — Gustavu… P. 52.
28 S. Zholkevskii — Sigizmundu III, Żółkiew, 4.05.1615, 17.05. 1615 // Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego, 
kanclerza koronnego i hetmana / ed. by A. Bielowski. Lwów, 1861. P. 232, 236. 
29 E. Gorn — Gustavu… P. 52; Ia. Kunovskii — E. Gornu, Kałpno (Kalpno), 4.03.1615 // TÜR. F. 6:B. 
L. 66–69; E. Gorn — Kh. Dembinskomu, Novgorod, 12.03.1615 // Ibid. L. 138–139.
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gentry. It is also easy to understand that this type of operation in war-ravaged region didn’t 
have any chance of success.
It is conceivable that the whole story was a false flag operation inspired by Gosiewski. 
In this situation the main actor of the plot was lieutenant Kunowski, a Protestant, who 
at the turn of 1613 was under the patronage of Lithuanian referendary and served in his 
regiment. Little is known about the early years of his military carrier. Since 1617 he had 
started to celebrate and praise in poetry all res gestas of his patron and commander. Over 
the course of two decades he had dedicated 15 of his works to Gosiewski30.
So, we do have to ask if Dembiński, about whom we do not presently have any de-
tailed information, Kunowski, Wolski and Plecki with their outfits weren’t by chance sent 
by Gosiewski to the Swedes as some kind of the Trojan horse or poisoned fruit. On the 
one hand, their service in the army of de la Gardie enabled them to gather information 
about the developments in Novgorod region on the eve of Swedish-Russian negotiations 
in Dederino and Stolbova. On the other hand, execution of the terms of the agreement, 
mentioned earlier, concerning recruitment of 4000 troops from the Commonwealth could 
have meant financial ruin for Sweden, already being in quite poor state after losing war 
with Denmark. The consequences were obvious. 
Aleksander Gosiewski had an experience in attempting at such clandestine opera-
tions in his long political and military carrier. He was, after all, a borderland starosta of 
Wielizh, Lithuanian referendary and one of closest associates of Great Chancellor Lew 
Sapieha, and as such was responsible for the operations of Lithuanian intelligence. For 
example, in 1609 it was his manipulated reports about the situation in Smolensk and at 
the Lithuanian-Russian border that determined the course of war between the Common-
wealth and Russia. The conflict was quite useful for further agenda of the Grand Duchy 
of Lithuania (especially, for Lew Sapieha) but not exactly for the Kingdom of Poland. Fur-
thermore, in 1611 while serving as commander of Polish-Lithuanian garrison in Moscow, 
he was involved in the murder of Prokofii Liapunov, one of the leaders of the first mili-
tia: he fabricated a letter with a signature and the seal of Liapunov. These were lies that 
discredited Liapunov. Gosiewski “threw” this letter to the Cossacks who were part of the 
first militia and hostile to Liapunov. They used it and murdered Liapunov31. These issues 
obviously require further studies.
But we digressed. Going back to the conflict between Dembiński and Horn — Swed-
ish commander rejected claims made by his Polish subordinate and his answer to the 
threats was the following: “His majesty (Gustav Adolf — TB) defeated all of his foes and 
there were no confederates powerful enough who with God’s help couldn’t be defeated, so 
I’ll tell you again — “your grace” — I would advise not to risk it because we will be defend-
ing ourselves with all our might”32.
In May 1615, to avoid escalation of the conflict Moor commanded his men to leave 
Polish- Lithuanian camp and start establishing a new one, although it is unclear whether 
he was following Horn’s orders in this regard. Left alone, Dembiński’s men became easy 
30 Kunowski J. Ekspedycja inflantska 1621  roku /  ed. by W. Walczak, K. Łopatecki. Białystok, 2007. 
S. 26–43.
31 A. Gosevskii  — L. Sapege, ze stanowiska między granicą łucką, toropiecką i wieliską, 
26.07.1609 // SRA. Skoklostersamlingen. E. 8597. L. 57–59 ob.; A. Gosevskii-Sigizmundu III, z granicy (ru-
bieży) wielkołuckiej, toropieckiej i wieliskiej, 30.07.1609 // Ibid. L. 60; Bohun T. Moskwa 1612… S. 147–151.
32 E. Gorn — Kh. Dembinskomu… L. 139.
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targets for the defenders of the city. In the middle of that month they were suddenly at-
tacked and obliterated. Horn noted that the Russians “had captured 50 men, most of the 
rest were killed and (Polish and Lithuanians — TB) got what they deserved”33.
Gustav Adolf tried to capture Pskov once again, but a three-month-siege of the city 
finally failed in October 1615, and negotiations between the Russians and Swedes began 
shortly in Dederino and Stolbova. Peace had been brokered by March of 1617.
The Polish and Lithuanian participation in the Swedish war efforts in the early 
17th century was, for obvious reasons, very limited. Cultural barriers and military conflicts 
between Sweden and the Commonwealth were the main obstacles. This had changed at 
the end of the first decade of the century when the Commonwealth engaged in war with 
Russia. Its unfavorable development for the-Lithuanian side exacerbated the problem of 
military confederacies, while at the same time saturated the marketplace of war with mer-
cenary soldiers eager to earn a living. This concerned primarily Ukrainian Cossacks, who 
had three main ways of making a living: very profitable raids on the shores of the Black Sea 
against Crimean Tatars and Turks (these were strongly opposed by the Commonwealth), 
participation in diversions against Russia (on their own or as part of larger operations 
conducted by Polish-Lithuanian colonels) and, lastly, enlisting in Swedish armed forces 
of governor Jacob de la Gardie. It is worth noticing that although Cossack outfits led by 
colonels Sidor and Boryszpolec didn’t play a major part in the war, their sheer numbers 
were notable, at least in the context of the Commonwealth. Their service in the Swedish 
military units was the logical conclusion of tactics applied by Lithuanian high command, 
which revolved around relieving the country of demoralized elements and making local 
arrangements with the governor of Novgorod.
The situation of outfits recruited from Polish-Lithuanian noble men was a little bit 
different. Mostly, they didn’t enlist in the army of de la Gardie because of legal constric-
tions resulting not only in penalties, but also ostracism from the rest of the “nation of 
gentry”. In the light of this, the fact that outfits under Dembiński, Jaromir Plecki and 
Stanisław Wolski served in the Swedish army was an unusual occurrence that needs fur-
ther explanation.
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